and, occasionally, in training-notwithstanding all the questions of methodology addressed here, I use "we" to refer to historians in general. Nonetheless, my professional formation and interest absolutely colors my perspective, and with the possible exception of Edmund Russell, I suspect that none of the roundtable participants identifies as a historian of science. I am not, however, a historian of biology. I specialize in the physical sciences, oscillating somewhere between chemistry, physics, and the borderlands beyond, which places obvious limits on my expertise in the specific biological details. In the discussion that follows, I consider this a virtue. Historians of biology have done excellent work on the history and sociology of epigenetics, extended genomes, primatology, and other subjects that come up repeatedly in these essays. 1 Some of these historians, after weighing their primary sources carefully in building scholarly arguments, have developed strong investments in contemporary biological debates: What is the appropriate level of selection (gene, species, group)? What counts as "a gene"? How much neuronal plasticity is there? There is no risk of that in my case; personally, I have no stakes in the outcome of these fascinating debates-I follow them as an interested observer. I hope that does not disappoint readers who expect a tussle over MHC compatibility, and that it relieves those who worry that this will become technical. It won't.
The other caveat is about university politics, principally in the United States and Europe. All of these essays are concerned, sometimes explicitly, with the relationship between history (or "the humanities," among which history is included when it is not moonlighting as a "social science"-whatever these terms are taken to mean) and "the sciences" or "STEM fields." This is an enormous source of concern within higher education at present, and every discipline will have to come to terms with the economic and administrative challenges that birthed this confrontation. The question of how those scholarly outcomes shape the relationships among the disciplineswho will learn more from (or be exploited more by) whom-is a question I cannot take up here. My principal concern in this commentary is what it would mean for historians to approach the findings of contemporary biology (and biological psychology) in the manner proposed by the contributors to this roundtable. What kind of history would we be writing?
One thing is absolutely clear, as has been persuasively argued by Daniel Smail (and many others): it is impossible to exclude "scientific claims" from our historical research. 2 Each of us incorporates them all the time; think of the physiology of sex organs, or which foodstuffs humans can digest. It is now utterly commonplace to date ancient events using records of eclipses, a body of data that arguably comprises the most long-lived scientific records. 3 I use scare quotes around "scientific claims" because what precisely counts as such is often the heart of the matter. When scientific claims are so ubiquitously accepted, so uncontroversial, that they have become the naturalists' equivalent of dead metaphors, we obviously deploy those findings without further reflection. Consider the basic facts of geography: the placement of the continents, their shape, the size of Earth. A few centuries ago, natural philosophers contested these matters vigorously, and fascinating histories have been written that oscillate between our maps of how the world looks and those mooted by the scholarly antagonists in Christopher Columbus's day. 4 It would be a bit precious to maintain a stance of agnosticism about whether Columbus actually arrived in India (as he believed) or in the Caribbean (as we now realize he did, retracing his logbooks and many other pieces of evidence). 5 You can assume the stance of radical skepticism, but you would then confront a series of philosophical conundrums incurred by your methodological choices-a topic best left to another time and place.
The crux of the matter is not, pace some claims in these essays, whether to use biology, but how that biology is being used, and which particular claims (especially "unsettled" science) are considered sufficiently stable to support a historical argument. 6 This is not the first time historians have faced this question.
RESISTANCE IS A RED FLAG FOR HISTORIANS. It functions as a historical marker in much the same way that Robert Darnton has treated jokes. As he demonstrated in a classic discussion, when you come across a joke you just do not get-that printers' apprentices in ancien régime France found executing cats to be hilarious, for example-this is an indication to start digging. 7 Why did this set of views and practices make sense in that culture, in that world? Indeed, Sigmund Freud famously related jokes to resistances: discomfort and hostility stemmed, he believed, from the same mechanism that made jokes funny. 8 Let's dig. Why is the historical profession so uncomfortable about the invocations of biology in history that the essays represent as, at the very least, intellectually stimulating and innovative approaches to thorny questions?
To the extent that the contributors to the roundtable address this question, we get an almost unified response: the massive cultural debate, especially in the United States, upon the publication of Edward O. Wilson's Sociobiology in 1975. (There was an Anglophone echo of this across the Atlantic the following year with the appearance of Richard Dawkins's The Selfish Gene.) As Kyle Harper states in his contribution, "The exclusion of evolutionary science from the study of the human culture was determined by developments in the study of evolution and the study of humanity specific to the 1970s and 1980s." The most central, and controversial, claim of sociobiology was that universal animal behaviors-including, crucially, human behavior-could be explained by evolutionary, and thus at core genetic, mechanisms. A furor erupted in the press and in scientific journals, and has generated some excellent histories of this moment. 9 But this was not, as the introduction to this roundtable would have it, a case of "humanists and social scientists" objecting to incursions of science into their traditional domains. The sociobiology controversy was also a noholds-barred clash among geneticists, paleontologists, evolutionary biologists, and other scholars within the life sciences. Part of the reason why there was hostility among non-scientists at the time, then, was that they objected to the importation of uncertain, unstable science-in-the-making as though it constituted hard consensus.
The controversy over sociobiology unquestionably generated resistance, especially for those historians who came of age during or before the 1970s. But a good portion of the historical profession (myself included) is younger than that, and this was not the source of our views about the bugbear of "biological determinism" within evolution or genetics. Perhaps more central was the controversy of Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray's The Bell Curve in 1994, or the recent kerfuffle over "scientism" sparked by Steven Pinker's article in the New Republic in 2013. 10 Also surely relevant was the successful rebranding of sociobiology as "evolutionary psychology," such that Walter Scheidel remarks on the recent origin of this latter field in the 1980s and 1990s-witness the years of the journals' emergence and proliferation-and does not inquire into why a discipline with nineteenth-century roots presents itself as having emerged out of nowhere in our lifetimes. 11 One point must be conceded: the hostility to genetic explanations of human behavior seemed to peter out by the late 1980s. Why this was so remains a bit of a mystery.
Resistance to biologically inflected history, however, goes further back-much further back. Historians have for centuries incorporated the latest findings of the sciences of their day (or, before science came into full flower in the early nineteenth century, natural philosophy and natural history) into their studies. The results have not been especially encouraging. Victorian racial theory and eugenics litter the histories of the turn of the twentieth century. 12 Today we believe-with excellent foun-9 For example, Ullica Segerstråle, Defenders of the Truth: The Battle for Science in the Sociobiology Debate and Beyond (New York, 2000) . The resonances of these discussions in non-Anglophone contexts remain terribly understudied. For an indication of the richness that awaits future historians, see Mark B. Adams, "The Soviet Nature-Nurture Debate," in Loren R. (Chicago, 2014) . 12 The historiography is vast, but was already well documented decades ago both by historians, as dation-that we know a good deal more about how human biology works than these individuals did, and that we can pinpoint both empirically and conceptually where they went astray. But they thought they were speaking with the best of warrants, grounded by the latest in science. If historians of science have anything to contribute to these debates, it is a forceful reminder that the science of any moment is ignorant of how the future will judge contemporary theories-some will be validated, others will go the way of phlogiston, the luminiferous ether, miasma theory, and the Asiatic origin of humanity. Enthusiasm for big data and quantitative reasoning is also nothing new. Consider the hoopla and swashbuckling over Henry Thomas Buckle's (unfinished) History of Civilization in England (1857-1861), which prompted a generation of intellectuals to wonder whether free will had anything to do with a humanity governed by demographics and statistical regularities. 13 There are very many ways to generalize badly from the science of the day and apply it to human behavior, and perhaps a historian can be forgiven for making the induction that this might not be the wisest course for him or her to pursue. I do not mean to say that we should ignore the science of our moment-far from it. We just need to be clear that science is a changeable and mutating collection of contradictory findings about the natural world-this is the source of its fascination for me and many of my colleagues-but even scientists are unable to say what will be right and what will be wrong, what will last and what will not. Are epigenetics and fMRIs fads or the keys to a deeper understanding? I do not believe that we historians will decide the issue.
A case in point: A few paragraphs ago, I cited Sigmund Freud as the warrant for a psychological claim about how the human mind processes jokes. What precisely is the status of that citation? I am hardly on shaky ground in stating that Freud's concept of the mind, however influential it has been in the humanities, is outside the consensus of present-day cognitive psychology. Nonetheless, for the first half of the twentieth century, psychoanalysis was unambiguously part of the scientific conversation in the discipline of psychology-always controversial, but also always science. Historians used it copiously, especially in biography, and that surely had something to do with its status as scientific. Nowadays it has been fringed to the margins, and it seems likely to stay there; yet this does not mean we should abandon thinking with it. As Lynn Hunt indicates with the same analogy, for her, biology "functions more like psychoanalysis once did (and still does for some); as a field, it poses important questions and opens up new approaches to the mind, the self, and human behavior." This brings us to the fundamental question of sources, and how historians might think about what biology has to teach us-not about the natural world, but about the historian's task.
in Nancy Stepan, The Idea of Race: Great Britain, 1800 -1960 (Hamden, 1982 , and biologists, as in Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (New York, 1981) .
13 See Theodore M. Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking, 1820 -1900 (Princeton, N.J., 1986 ; and Ian Hacking, The Taming of Chance (Cambridge, 1990) . Lynn Hunt's invocation of Gustav Le Bon as an earlier origin of the hostility postdates Buckle but was surely of greater moment in the Francophone intellectual world.
ONE CAN MAKE A DISTINCTION AMONG three general kinds of sources we use in historical research: primary sources, secondary sources, and methodological sources. These designations are not essential properties of the sources themselves. (Most obviously, the division between primary and secondary is notoriously fraught in dealing with recent history.) Rather, I understand these distinctions as deriving from how we use the source. When it appeared, Thomas S. Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) was cited by many historians as a secondary source about the development of quantum mechanics or the Chemical Revolution of the late eighteenth century. Later, and most prominently, it became a widespread methodological source, seeding the term "paradigm" like ineradicable kudzu across scholarly discourse. (Harper uses it in his contribution, and Julia Thomas deploys another Kuhnian term, "incommensurable.") Interestingly, in the last several years, scholars have treated the book as a primary source in American intellectual history, growing out of the Cold War context at Harvard University. 14 The same life cycle can be observed for many other classic histories. Michel Foucault's Discipline and Punish was once a secondary source on the history of the prison, then a methodological source on thinking about space, power, and the body, and finally also a primary source on 1968 in Paris or the Attica prison riots. As both examples indicate, scholarly writing tends to emerge as secondary literature, but that status is unstable in the face of future developments. This point is important for what follows, as we consider biological articles and monographs.
What kinds of sources are the scientific works cited by the contributors to this roundtable? What we see least is use of these works as primary sources, which happens to be the way historians of science most frequently treat them. As noted earlier, recent scholarship in my field has begun to historicize some of the very scientific ideas and concepts invoked in these papers, such as the CCR5-⌬32 mutation associated with resistance to the Human Immunodeficiency Virus. 15 This, however, is not the problematic of the roundtable.
The roundtable, taken as a whole, articulates a strong case for the potential utility of biological findings as methodological sources. For some authors, such as Hunt, this point is explicit: "Attention to recent developments in neuroscience," she argues, "can stimulate new ways of thinking about historical interpretations of selfhood." Contemporary biology is no doubt a fascinating source of methodological insights about agency (conscious and unconscious motivation, levels of selection, definitions of genomic and non-genomic inheritance), causation (Niko Tinbergen's famous four levels), and scale (as in Thomas's discussion here) that reward sustained reflection. Historians have always been remarkably eclectic in our tools, borrowing "thick description" from anthropology at one moment, "style" from art history at another, and a whole raft of concepts from economics. The power of this roundtable lies in showing some of the flexibility and innovation that is possible if we open up our methodological toolboxes to some guiding concepts in today's life sciences. This modest goal, clearly articulated in several of the contributions, deserves further thought and elaboration, and I hope this discussion will contribute to that.
The worry, to my mind, comes in using biological research as a secondary source. I confess to being rather bewildered by some of the ways the essays do this. Consider, for example, a passage in Randolph Roth's otherwise fine essay: "There is substantial evidence, however, that testosterone levels increase in human males before and during competitive sporting events, that males with low base levels of serotonin are more impulsive and prone to violence, and that lowering serotonin levels with a tryptophan-depleting beverage increases the likelihood of aggression and retaliation in computer games." (I select this example essentially at random, and not to pick on Roth; I could just as easily have brought up addicted macaques or something else.) How are we to understand this? The problem starts with the first three words: "There is evidence." 16 Imagine a simple substitution: "There is evidence that homosexuality was widespread in medieval monastic life." I anticipate that my medievalist colleagues would love to see where a footnote to such a sentence went. How does the author define homosexuality? Is the relevant term "sodomy" or something else? Is the reference in the footnote a secondary article based on a single monastery or several? In which country or region? In which period? What kinds of sources does the author of that study cite? If the primary source behind this claim was written by a Lutheran polemicist in the sixteenth century, I expect that one could dismiss it as not being a statement of fact about the Middle Ages without a second thought. This is simply how practicing historians treat secondary literature: interrogate the evidence behind the interpretation, juxtapose it to other secondary literature, review the translations, follow the citation trail to see how other scholars have reacted to the finding . . . This is why Kuhn and Foucault are no longer used as secondary sources-and, for that matter, why Freud is no longer a secondary source on how humor operates.
So, "there is evidence." What kind of evidence? Was this a field study or a lab study? How large was the N ? What statistical significance? Were there controls? (There had better be.) How was the study designed? Was there a meta-analysis? What is the reception of this finding by specialists in the field? When were the findings gathered, and how have they aged? Historians do not typically ask these kinds of questions, but these are precisely the ones we need to ask of every sentence that resembles this, both when we read and when we write.
Nonetheless, Roth points both in this passage and throughout his essay to important findings that can change the way we understand our own historical evidence. Source bias works in both directions, as Russell helpfully notes: much of the reason why historians do not recognize the effects of biological evolution is that the men and women who produced our primary source material did not comprehend the transformations in their environment, their livestock, and their health as what we 16 The bland passive voice, which crops up fairly frequently in these contributions, is a natural consequence of reading large quantities of scientific prose, where the passive voice dominates (as it did in scientific German and French before they were eclipsed by the massive wave of publication in English). Alan G. Gross, Joseph E. Harmon, and Michael S. Reidy, Communicating Science: The Scientific Article from the 17th Century to the Present (New York, 2002) . The passive voice provides an illusion of existential certainty that is common in scientific writing but blankets agency, contingency, and specificity-the hallmarks of historical reasoning. now with very high certainty understand them to be. Historians who shun the biological literature must equally understand that they are shutting off access to potentially significant phenomena that can help us interpret the events of the past. Just because our actors did not understand the neurological rewiring that comes with addiction, for example, that is not in itself a sufficient argument to dismiss the implications that recognition of neurological discoveries presents to us.
IT SEEMS, THEN, THAT WE NEED TO BE wary of uncritically using biology, but not too wary. How do we find the right balance? There is, I expect, no general rule, and we will have to work it out on a case-by-case basis. There are, however, some additional dangers we need to keep in mind when we follow the helpful injunction of the roundtable participants to look around at what the biologists might teach us, both factually and methodologically. I conclude with two concerns about the status of the biological literature as a source of information that go deeper than how to interpret a particular paper, or a claim within that paper.
The first issue, sadly, is misconduct. Misrepresented or simplify falsified results are constantly an issue in the sciences, ranging from biomedicine to physics, and the peer review system has been notably incapable of filtering out many significant instances of deceit. 17 Historians, as readers of this journal are surely aware, have faced similar problems, but the situation is likely more severe in the sciences because the stakes are higher (grant money, prestige) and the level of oversight is lower due to the much larger number of researchers and publication outlets (it is harder to sniff out malefactors). Even in cases without deliberate malfeasance, there have been serious allegations of misinterpretation or over-reading of the data. In 2011, Marc Hauser, at the time a leading representative of the cutting edge of evolutionary psychology at Harvard University, was censured for the publication of questionable studies and resigned his post. 18 I do not believe that evolutionary psychology, human evolution, and epigenetics are more prone to such scandals than other subfields, but the ever-present possibility raises the stakes for rigor when historians choose to reference specific findings. Biologists read dozens or hundreds of papers in the field; I expect we will read fewer, raising the risk of misrecognizing a flawed finding as reasonable. If we want to use this data, we need to do exactly what we do with our own secondary material, which is to scrutinize method and go into details of how the data is gathered.
The second point, alluded to above in the discussion of the sociobiology controversies, concerns consensus. One of the reasons the history of recent science is so challenging is that we don't have the luxury of knowing "the right answer." Bracketing for present purposes the significant philosophical objection that every scientific claim is in principle revisable, we are probably on safe ground with science that seems to be settled consensus. Say, the statement "electrons exist." You would be hard-pressed to find any scientist not exiled to the nether regions of the fringe who would deny this claim. But in 1897, when J. J. Thomson first claimed that he had discovered a negatively charged particle smaller than the (still hypothetical) atom of hydrogen, there was quite a bit of heated discussion, and the formation of consensus took time. 19 This wonderful instability of science-in-the-making raises concerns about how confident we can be when we draw on contemporary science in formulating historical arguments. How can we historians be confident, when biologists themselves are not? E. O. Wilson, as the contributors point out, has revised his views since the 1970s and now allows for more cooperation in animal behavior. In the middle decades of the twentieth century, as it happens, many biologists focused on group cooperation and minimized individual selection. This position was then challenged vigorously in the sociobiology era and has today, to some extent, been revived. 20 The biologists have better evidence for cooperation than in the immediate postwar moment, but I doubt that anyone would responsibly announce that we have nailed down the question of human nature as tightly as the electron's existence.
I found the essays in this roundtable to be stimulating precisely because they forced me to confront my assumptions about what makes a tractable historical question, what constitutes reliable evidence, and what is fruitful historical practice. This hits at the center of the methodological use of biology and history, a line of inquiry that I do not doubt will continue to produce dividends as more of us explore how to think biologically about our research questions. The purpose of the roundtable is to induce us to address these questions and reflect on these matters explicitly. We will be better historians for the provocation. 19 The electron example is very rich and multidimensional. Those interested can do no better than to turn to Theodore Arabatzis, Representing Electrons: A Biographical Approach to Theoretical Entities (Chicago, 2006 
